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In the Suprente Cottrt of the
State of Utah

MARGARET CONOVER and LO·RRAINE
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BOARD OF EDUCATIO·N, NEBO SCHOOL
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LAVON PAYNE, L. J. CRABB, WILLIAM F.
BROADBENT, DR. JESSE ELLS·WORTH,
Board Members; and B. L. ISAAC, Clerk of
said Board,
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NO. 8048

1

IRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We cannot accept the Statement of Facts set out in
appellants' brief as a complete or proper statement. We cannot accept the premise of amici curiae's brief, which also
is based on erroneous fact assumptions.
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The case was submitted and decided upon an agreed
stn te1nent of facts, comprised of the allegations of the complaint admitted by the defendants and the affirmative allegations of the answet· which were, by stipulation, taken to
be true. The plaintiffs, in effect, interposed a demurrer to
the answer and the case was determined on this basis. By
this stipulation the plaintiffs waived the introduction of evidence by defendants in support of their answer and now
cannot be heard to say that the stipulation should be ignored
and the issues of fact determined against the defendants,
contrary to the findings of the court because defendants
took plaintiffs at their word and rested upon the stipulation. Yet, plaintiffs and appellants in their brief, in effect,
take that very position. Their purported Statement and
Point 1 in the brief disregard the admitted facts necessary
for a proper understanding of the case.
Reference is made to the transcript, consisting of three
pages of the record on appeal (22-24). The following was
the understanding:
"MR. MANGUM: If the Court please, I believe that a
stipulation at this time would be in order, and I believe, if I understand it, Mr. Christensen will agree to
stipulate that the matter be submitted op. the pleadings.
MR. CHRISTENSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

MR. MANGUM: (co~tinuing) In this case, without
the taking of any additional testimony, I assume, Mr.
Christenson,· that the denials which the law gives me,
as to matters pleaded in the answer, are still available
to me? There are some things pleaded there in the
answer that I would not necessarily agree to, but I don't
believe they are essential in the trial of this matter.
MR. CHRISTENSON:

Of course I am standing on my
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ans\ver, if the court please. I have admitted all I can
admit, and I think all I should admit, and we think
that on the basis of the facts alleged in the answer.
that \Ve are entitled to prevail. And as I understand
it, on the basis of the facts stated in the answer, together \vith our admissions of the facts stated in the
complaint. to the extent that \Ve have admitted them,
Mr. Mangum believes that the plaintiffs are entitled to
prevail. And it is on that basis that \ve are submitting
the matter.
MR. MANGUM:

Right.

THE COURT: All right. The record may so show."
(File, page 23).
The court's findings of fact refer to this stipulation in
the following words:
"The above entitled cause came on duly and regularly for hearing before the court, Hon. Wm. Stanley
Dunford, Judge, sitting without a jury on the 22nd day
of April, 1953; and it having been stipulated that the
.cause should be submitted to the court on its merits
on the admissions made, and facts alleged, in the ans. the
wer which should be taken as true
court now makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT
"
The appellants and amici curiae in disregard of the stipulation, have briefed the case on the basis of part only of
the facts before the trial court.
When the plaintiffs called in person at the Nebo School
District office, and asked to be permitted to examine, and
copy, the minutes of the meeting in question, said minutes
were not available and only tentative notes of such minutes
had been transcribed, subject to the approval of the Board
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of Education; that said tentative notes had not been appt·ov<'d, and had not been entered in, or made a part of, the
journal \vhich \Vas kept by the clerk of the said Board of
Education (Finding 3. p. 27; Answer 4-5, p. 19).
The rneetings of the board are public and no attempt
has been n1ade by the board to restrict plaintiffs' attendance
at such nlPetings or to prevent them from obtaining information froJn anyone in attendance thereat as to the happenings of the meeting (Finding 6, p. 28; Answer 10, p. 16).
I )revious to the meeting in question, release by the clerk

of tentative notes of proceedings prior to their checking and
approval by the board has involved inaccuracies in reporting the business transacted by the board and its proceedings
and because of such fact, the board has adopted the procedw..e of having tentative notes submitted to it for checking and for approval before they are accepted as minutes
of meetings; that there has been no effort made to suppress
·any information as to action or proceedings taken by the
board, nor to prevent in any way the attendance of the
plaintiffs or any interested citizens at board meetings, or
to prevent the plaintiffs or anyone else from examining all
of its minutes and other official records at the earliest practicable time, but that plaintiffs by reason of motives personal to themselves have demanded that the clerk immediately transcribe his notes and make them available for inspection and copying; that all records, including the journal,
have been properly kept by the clerk and they have always
been available for inspection of the plaintiffs and that the
minutes of the particular meeting referred to by plaintiffs
within a reasonable time after February 18th, 1953, were
approved by the board and entered in the journal and have
been available to plaintiffs and other citizens for inspection
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(Finding 7, pp. 28-29: Ans\ver, Third and Fourth Defenses~
pp. 17-19).
At no time have the defendants or any of them withheld from the plaintiffs or refused to permit them to inspect
or to have full access to the official journal of the board, including all official minutes or public writings concerning
the said meetings and that said journal as kept by the clerk
has been at all times, and is, available for the inspection of
plaintiffs, or any of them, or any other citizens. That t,he
action of the clerk of the board in not having the said tentative notes entered in the journal as official minutes of
said meeting until approved by the board to assure their
accuracy at the following meeting of the board was, and is,
reasonable, and that the demand of plaintiffs for a release
of said tentative notes as public writings the day following
said meeting was not reasonable or timely (Finding 8, pp.
29-30; Answer, para. 11 and Third and Fourth Defenses, pp.
17-19).
POINTS OR QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED
The appellants argue that the findings of fact of the
trial court are not supported by the record. Implicit in the
b1;ef of amici curiae is the same assumption. We have already set out the facts in this respect and will not repeat
them. Yet for the sake of raising the direct issue we will
briefly discuss the point in our argument. The only other
contention of appellants is that "The transcribed tentative
notes or minutes are public writings" (App. Brief, p. 8 et
seq). Counsel for amici curiae apparently concedes that the
controlling question is whether the tentative notes demanded
by appellants were public writings (their brief, pp. 3, 14, 15-
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1 X).

H oweve r, his brief primarily is based on the assump-

tion that the record in question was a public writing or record. F'rom this he argues that if newspapers are denied acCt ·~s to public writings, constitutional rights will be infringed

the public interest impaired. Let this be conceded-·and
\\'t"\ \\'ottld be among the last to argue against it if the premises of the argument were valid. Most of the brief of amici
curiae begs the question; more, before a less deliberate body
it would involve danger through tyranny of concept without reference to facts of confusing and prejudicing the real
merits of the controversy.
The "issues", as stated on pages 3 to 4 of the brief of
amici curiae, and the points indexed and discussed therein,
do not entirely correspond. Counsel, himself, points out that
he is presenting the issues mentioned "collectively, since
they are all interrelated with the position which the amici
curiae wish to present to this Court.'' Under these circum·stances, we see no point in attempting to follow the de~led
presentation on these collateral phases, statement by state- .
ment. We will attempt to answer them under the last division of our argument which seems designed to permit joinder of issue on the primary contentions of amici curiae.
We therefore will present our case under the following
c )J'

points:
I. The findings of the trial court, which accept as true-

the allegations of fact contained in the answer in accordance
with the express stipulation of the parties, is supported by
the record, for it was by so stipulating that appellants
avoided the introduction of evidence which might have been
more unfavorable t6 their contention.
II. The :notes demanded .by appellants were not "public writings."
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III. To hold that the notes in question \Vere public writings or that the appellants, rather than the clerk and the
board, should dictate the exact time such notes should be
transcribed, completed or entered in the journal \vould necessarily involve the result that tentative memoranda representing mere steps in mental or administrative processes
would be subject at any time to demands for copying, certification, publication and introduction in evidence as proof
of final action, to the impairment or destruction of the functions of public agencies, including courts; the deceiving and
confusion of the public and to the injury of the general welfare.
IV. No constitutional, or other, rights of freedom ot
the press are involved in' a refusal to treat as a public writing_ that which is not a public writing; the complaint and
fact being not that any information was actually denied or
withheld, or that the tentative notes were accurate, but that
the respondents failed to recognize and release as an official, or public, writing, the tentative notes on which an ac~urate journal record would be based after correction and
upon the completion of the mental and administrative processes reasonably necessary to insure their accuracy.
V. Conclusion: The judgment of the trial court was
correct and sound that under the admitted circumstances
set out in the answer the tentative notes made by the clerk
which were demanded by the plaintiff before their approval
by the board and prior to their entry in the journal "W!ere
not public writings within the purview of Sec. 78-26-1, UCA,
1953; that the notes or memoranda taken by the clerk for
his own convenience in the process of entering an accurate
record in the journal are not public records; that a clerk has
a right to take reasonable steps in assuring the accuracy
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of journal entries contemplated by the statute; that the
~tt~ps taken by the respondent for this purpose were not unl'<•asonabh•, and that the Court may not require the immediate l'llk•ase of such tentative notes as public records with
thP incicll~nts of ce1'tification, publication as official action,
~tnd admissibility in evidence, as sought by the appellants
in this ('(U~P.

ARGUMENT
I. 'l'he findings of the trial court, which accept as true
t h(• allegations of fact contained in the answer in accordaJu·t~ \\'ith the express stipulation of the parties is supported
by the n·eord, for it was by so stipulating that appellants
avoided the introduction of evidence which may have been
n1ore unfavorable to their contention.
We have set out the stipulation in our statement of fact.
That stipulation probably authorized the court to make
findings on mixed questions of fact and law more unfavorable to appellants' contention than it did. Yet, in its findings it did not seek to preclude appellants on anything but
stipulated facts. Respondents were prepared to prove the
allegation of fact in their answer. The details of appellants'
motives and conduct, we surmise, were known by appellants
to be less favorable to them than the relatively brief allegations of the answer. In any event, appellants stipulated that
the case might be submitted upon the allegations of the answer. This, in effect, was a demurrer to the sufficiency of
the answer, or tantamount to a motion by appellants for
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In such
event the allegations of the answer and all reasonable intendments and inferences therefrom should be taken as
true and the demurrer should be sustained or motion granted only if the facts shown were insufficient as a matter of
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la\\r. Orpheus Vaudeville Co. v. Clayton Inv. Co., 41 Utah
605, 128 Pac. 575: R. J. Daun1 Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 Pac.
2cl 817, ____ Utah________ ; 12(c) URCP.
After setting out various findings of the court, appellants state (Appellants' Brief, p. 8) that they are "mere allegations of respondents, not admitted by appellants." Thus,
the basis of this surprising contention in view of the stipulation made by appellants in open court, is stated to be that
"Rule 8(d). . . . provides that such allegations shall
be taken as denied or a voided . . . .'' This rule covers
general averments in a pleading to which no responsive
pleading is required or permitted, they being "Taken as denied or avoided." It manifestly has no reference to stipulated facts, or a submission of a case as on motion for judgment on the pleadings.
No findings having been pointed out which are not fully
supported by the facts on which it was stipulated the case
should be submitted, and appellants being in error as to the
applicability of rule 8(d), URCP, we submit that the findings of the trial court should be sustained.
H. The notes demanded by appellants were not public writings.

Actually, the determinative issue in this case is whether
the notes demanded by appellants under the circumstances
and at the time demanded were public writings as contemplated by Section 78-26-1 and 2, U~CA, 1953. The appellants,
as well as amici curiae base their claim to ,the right of inspection upon this statute. (Appellants' brief, p. 25; brief of
amici curiae, p. 13). Even the recent book written under
commission of the American Society of Newspaper Editors
and slanted from the standpoint of a claim to full freedom
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of acc-ess by newspapers, concedes that such right of access
by ne\vspapers, as well as citizens. in general, is limited to
\vhat 1nay be considered under statutory definition or comrnan law "puhlic writings or records." (Haro~d L. Cross,
"The P<·ople's Right to I<now", Columbia University, 1953).
1~he

right of inspe~tion by the express terms of our
statut<~ is limited to "public writings."
Section 78-26-2,
UCA, 1953, is as follows:
"Right to Inspect and Copy. Every citizen has a
right to inspect and take a copy of any public writing
of this state except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute."
The last authority cited in the brief of amici curiae,
Nowack vs. Fuller, 219 N. W. 749, 60 A. L. R. 1351, points
out that when a statute specifically enumerates public records for inspection, it excludes others.

Therefore, if the notes in question were public writings
the right of inspection and copying existed, as well as to
have certified copies furnished (Sec. 78-26-3, UCA, 1953),
and if they were not public writings such right did not exist.
On this issue we take the liberty of quoting from the
memorandum decision of the trial court:

"What are public writings? Section 78-26-1, UCA,
1953, says:
tPublic writings are divided into four classes
Laws
(2) Judicial records
( 3) Other official documents
(4) Public, records, kept in state, of private writings.'
(1)
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"l\1inutes of the School Board are neither 'la\vs' or
'judi<!ial records' nor are they -in their nature, 'private
"Titings', as the only purpose of their existencP is to
'keep an accurate journal' (53-6-15, UCA 1953) of the
doings of a 'body corporate' having an 'official seal'
(53-4-8, UCA. 1953). They are kept by clerk (53-6-15,
UCA, 1953) who is elected by the school board (53-63, UCA, 1953) and \:vho may be removed by it during
his t\Yo-year term by a t\vo-thirds vote (53-6-7, UCA,
1953).
"Thus the question narrows to this: are ·notes7
or memoranda, of the proceedings of the school board~
taken by the clerk for his own convenience in entering
the 'accurate' record into the 'journal', 'other official
documents', so as to bring them within the sub-section
( 3) , 78-26-1 above and subjecting them to inspection of
any citizen as set forth in Sec. 78-26-2 above?
"In determining this question we must keep in
mind that the records sought by the plaintiffs are
'public records' (so as to make the plaintiffs' demand
for inspection and copying efficaceous under Section
78-26-2, if at all, only by reason of the statute. Thus
we must carefully observe the language employed by
the Legislature in setting up what would be considered
'official documents' of the school board.
"Section 53-6-15 enjoins upon the clerk the duty
of keeping a 'journal'. 'Journal' is defined by The New
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, as:
' (3)
events.

A diary: An account of daily transactions or

(4) The record of transactions kept by a deliberative body or assembly. Specif. The record of daily
proceedings of a legislative body kept by a clerk.'
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"Thus the official record of the board kept by the
clerk. is not merely an account book, nor merely a minut (' book, nor merely a narrative of acts and duties perfnrn;t'd by thP board, but it is all of them combined.
"At this point in our analysis, special attention must

paid to the word 'accurate' in connection with the
'journal'. That word is defined by the same Webstt·r ituthority as:

be

\VOrd

'In exact or careful conformity to truth or to some
standar-d of requirement, exp. as the result of care;
freP from failure, error or defect; exact as an accurate
talculator: accurate knowledge.'

"Certainly it cannot be successfully disputed that
the legislature in its enactment of 53-6-15 deliberately
inserted 'accurate' as a limitation of the word 'journal'
or that the legislative design was to have it given full
weight under its ordinary definition, and in light of its
ordinary usage. It did not thus contemplate that hasty
memoranda made by the clerk under pressure of the
business of a session of the board and burdened with
error which reason and common knowledge would expect to exist in it, should be deemed an 'accurate journal'. The legislature had in mind such common error
when it inserted the qualifying word, and it had in full
contemplation, the damage which may be done the administration of our public school system if false or inaccurate reports of official acts should reach
public. It has deliberately provided the safety qualification against error by insertion of the word 'accurate'.
Thus it must be held that memoranda of the happenings at a meeting are subject to determination of their
accuracy before they become official documents.

the

'How is the clerk to determine whether or not his
tentative notes prepared for insertion into- the official
journal are accurate? In the first place, it seems evi-
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dent that his efforts should be reasonably calculated
to produce accuracy. In other words, he could not, under a pretense of determining accuracy, withhold entry
from the journal for \veeks \Vhile he engaged in a
lengthy hocus pocus not calculated in reason to result
in verification of his proposed entries. He must have
his record of meetings truly and accurately deflect the
actual happenings at such meetings, for the reason that
it isn't the record \Vhich authorizes and makes official
the actions taken by the board. Rather, when a matter is properly presented and lawful action has been
taken upon it by the body which has jurisdiction to act,
their action, and not the record of their action constitutes the authority to proceed in accordance therewith.
State ex rei Sheridan Pub. Co. v. Goodrich, 140 S. W.
620. Henshaw vs. State, 47 N. E. 157. City of Talladega v. Jackson Tinney Lumber Co., 95 So. 455.
"The record is to be made after the official action
taken, by entry in an accurate history thereof into the
journal."
(File 38-40) .
Appellants say that the issue is not whether the· tentative notes were at the time involved in such a condition as
to be a part of the "journal", but whether they were "an
official document" (p. 25) . If they were not a part of the
journal they would not be a part of the record the law re-quires the clerk to keep.
Appellants argue that it is not the prerogative of the
board to require approval of minutes kept by the clerk before they are entered in the journal. It may well be, as they
urge, that if there were an issue between the school board
and the clerk as to the manner of keeping the minutes there
would be significance to a distinction between the supervisory powers of the board, which appoints and can remove the
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clerk, and the statutory duties of the clerk to keep an accurate record. However, there is no such issue here. The clerk
in cooperation with the board has deterinined the means
best adapted for making accurate entri~s in the journal.
Certainly, cooperation to this end between the clerk and
the board is not against public po~icy, nor subject to question by the appellants.
We think the trial court rightly pointed out the following additional reasons:
"Is it reasonable, then, for the board to require its
own approval before proposed entries in the journal are
accepted for recordation as the official history of the
acts taken by the board? It appears that this question
can best be answered by posing others, viz: What
other means would be so well calculated to produce the
. statutory requirement for accuracy? Who could know
what was proposed in a motion so well as the one who
proposed it, the one who seconded it, and the ones who
voted upon it? Neither the pleadings nor the arguments suggest any other means equally calculated to
produce accuracy, and the court can conceive of none;
"The statute does not prescribe at what time or
how soon after the happening that an item of the event
must be recorded in the 'accurate' journal'. Under such
circumstances, and the rule is so universal as to require
no citation of authority to support it, where the law
fixes no limitation upon the time, it must be reasonable.
No facts are before the court as to the time expiring
between meetings of the board, nor the time expiring
after the approving meetings before the minutes of
meetings are actually entered into the official journal,
but it does appear that the plaintiffs in the instant case
demanded an inspection of the clerk's notes, which by .
then had been transcribed but had not been verified by
the board nor entered in the journal, on the morning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
following the meeting in question. How early the next
n1orning, or \Vhether the board had met in the interiln,
does not appear. The burden is upon the plaintiffs to
prove their cause by a preponderance of the evidence,
and there being nothing in the stipulation to indicate
to the contrary, the court must, and accordingly does
hold that the demand was not timely made because no
opportunity had been had by the board to determine
or establish the accuracy of the clerk's proposed entries
and to order the 'accurate' entries to be made in the
journal.
"What the plaintiffs sought to inspect was not public record under the provisions of 78-26-1, supra, and
plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to inspect them
under the authority to inspect public writings under
the provisions of 78-26-2, supra.
"The plaintiffs' primary contention is that the notes
taken by the clerk at the board meeting, and particularly after such notes have been transcribed for presentation to the next meeting of the board for approval,
although not yet made part of the 'journal' are admissible as evidence of the matters contained therein in an
action at law or _equity nnder the provisions of 78-25-3
and 78-25-4, UCA, 1953, and that, therefore, they are
themselves public records coming within the class of
'ather official documents' denominated by 78-26-1, and
are thus subject to inspection and copying as provided
by 78-26-2. · In considering this question, it must be
kept clear·ly in mind that Section 53-6-15 does not require, or even provide for, the taking of the men1oranda by the clerk during board meetings, or the transcription of any tentative copies thereof for approval
of the board. Its requirement is that the clerk shall
keep an 'accurate journal'.
"Such rna terials are thus not 'entries in public or
other official books or records made in the performance
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of duty' as provided in 78-25-3, nor are they entries
'made by an officer or board of officers, or under the
direction or in presence of either in the course of official
duty' as provided in Section 78-25-4. The same ~/ebster
authority cited above, so far as the definition is applicable to the problem here involved, defines 'entry' as
an 'act of making or entering a record, as an entry of
a sale. Also that which is entered; an item; a putting
upon record in proper form or order'. Inscription of
notes by the clerk, or the tentative transcription thereof prior to entry in the 'accurate journal' any more than
the clerk's individual recollection of the items of business transacted at a meeting of the board, are not 'official documents', and because they are not, they are not
admissible in evidence as a public record, Steiner v.
McMillan (Mont)., 195 Pac. 836; State v. Ray (Mont)
2944 Pac. 368; Steel v. Johnson (Wash) 115 P.2d 145,
and are not within the provision of the startute granting
citizens the right of perusal."
Appellants go further than merely to contend that they
have the right to inspect public writings-they assume
the prerogative of dictating or having the court at their behest dictate the time and the manner in which the clerk
transcribes the minutes and enters the minutes in the journal. They conclude their brief by contending in effect that
even though the clerk might have been justified in declining
to turn over the particular notes requested by them at the
particular time, yet the court should declare that as of that
time, the clerk should have made his accurate entries in the
journal so that it would have been available immediately to
appellants.
We think this is rather presumptive on the part of appellants, and that it would be beyond the prerogative of the
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:ninistrative matter \vas to perform his duties, in opposition
to the board, entrusted with his supervision, and contrary
to the judgment of the clerk himself. There is nothing in
the statute \Vhich required the accurate entry in the journal
to be made immediately; and indeed, if there were such a
requirement, the failure to allow proper time would preclude
the very accuracy enjoined.
We believe that the trial court was correct in holding
that it was not unreasonable for the clerk to take proper
time to insure accuracy of the entry. We quote from pages
~5-47 of the memorandum decision:
"As pointed out in the recital of facts supra, the
board meeting in question was held on February 18,
1953. During some hour of the following day the demand was made by plaintiffs to examine the minutes
of the meeting. By that time the clerk has assembled
his notes apparently made concurrently with the meeting and had transcribed them into a tentative copy for
submission to the board for rejection, amendment or
approval as the board may direot. While it is clear
that the board requires such approval before entry of
the minutes into the journal, and that such approval is
accomplished at the succeeding meeting, there is no indication as to how frequently or infrequently such meetings are held. Certainly if the succeeding meeting were
scheduled for the afternoon or evening of the 19th no
one could say that the delay caused by the rule of the
board would be an unreasonable restriction. Likewise
if the board was not to meet for a month after the meet'3
ing in question, the time would as clearly be unreasonable, under the urgence of the argument, at least, of
the plaintiffs, that actions would be taken in the interim affecting substantial rights of citizens which
would likely render plaintiffs' contrary efforts ex post
facto if so much time were consumed.
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"It is easily conceivable that the variation in length
of 'a reasonable time' in order to complete the 'journal'
may be great depending upon the nature of the business
transacted, e. g. if the board had voted to employ all
school funds in its hands in construction of a street railway to pick up and deliver pupils to the schools and the
proposed contract of construction were to be signed
within the week, such a matter is not the same at all
as an action taken by the board to change the type of
notebooks to be supplied for the succeeding year. The
duty of the clerk to have his proposed entries in the
journal determined to be accurate would have added to
it a duty of action so immediate as to allow no other
duty to interfere with promptness in the first instance,
while he would conceivably have no duty of urgency at
all in the second.
"Where 'accuracy' of the journal is· enjoined by
the express wording of the statute, the legislature contemplated that some reasonable means would be devised by the board to insure that quality. The legislature did not specifically prescribe such means, and
therefore left it to the sound discretion of the board,
which appoints and supervises the duties of the clerk,
to devise such processes of its own as would meet its
duty to insure both accuracy, and reasonable prompt_ness as is enjoined by the law insuring all citizens the
right of inspection and copying.
"·Of common necessity there must always be some
time between formal action of any legislative or administrative body and the formation of the 'official documents' evidencing the act. Thus, so long as the board
here acted with reasonable promptness and dispatch,
having in mind the nature of the business, and all of
the facts and circumstances surrounding it, the body
discharged the duty imposed upon it by law, and no
citizen is entitled to complaint that the 'accurate' jour-
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nal' \Vhich is the only 'official document' respecting actions of the board, had not been prepared instanter for
their inspection and copying.
"Nothing appearing in the record to indicate that
the defendants unreasonably delayed preparation of its
official record, or denied the plaintiffs inspection \Vhen
it was prepared, it follows that the plaintiffs' petition
for a decree requiring the- defendants to promptly transcribe the minutes of their meetings and make the1n
immediately available for inspection and copy must be
and is accordingly denied."
(File 45-47).
Section 53-6-15, UCA, 1953, in addition to providing
that the clerk shall keep an accurate journal of its (the
board's) proceedings, also provides that "He shall perform
such other duties as the board or its committee shall require." It is not contemplated that the clerk should work
at loggerheads with the board, but ~ather that he should
cooperate with the board. If he thinks, as appears from the
record here, that the discharge of his duty with respect to
making accurate entries in the journal can best be aceomplished by having the assistance of the board, this should
not render his action any less proper or reasonable.
We call attention to the case of Kent, et al v. School
District, (Okla) 233 Pac. 431, in which the court stated (p.
432): "Comp. Stat. 1921, para. 10355, defines the duties
of the clerk but nowhere requires that he shall record the
minutes of any meeting before the meeting adjourns. It is
the general, if not the unvarying, custom in this state for
the minutes of deliberative and administrative boards, covering either regular or special meetings, to be recorded and
presented for adoption at the next succeeding regular meet-
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ing. In the absence of conflicting statute, no reason is apparent why this rule should not control in school board meetings.''
The entries in the journal are merely a means of proof
or record of official action and do not constitute the action.
Appellants emphasized in their ·complaint, and emphasize in
their brief, that the school board has on occasion taken action based upon resolutions adopted in meetings even before
the entries were made in the journal. They err in assuming
that such action would not be proper. Of course, when it
comes to the proof of the action taken at the meeting the
journal entries are the best evidence.
Appellants have cited cases holding that in the absence of an official writing such as a journal entry, the
clerk's tentative notes may be looked to to define the action
taken at a meeting. This, of course, does not make the
clerk's tentative notes the official writings or record but
merely secondary proof as to what actually occurred. Under certain circumstances, the testimony of persons present
may be looked to in the absence of an official record to
show what action actually was taken. Yet, ·could it be contended that the declaration of a third person so looked to1
even though in writing, were official records?
As of possible interest in this connection, reference is
made to the annotation, "Necessity, Sufficiency and Effect
of Matters of Record of Meetings of School Board," 12 ALR
235, and the cases cited therein, and in the Blue Book supplements to such annotations.
We submit that the tentative notes of the clerk were
not a "public writing" within the contemplation of the statute.
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m.

To. hold that the notes in question \\'el'C public
\Vritings or tha.t the appellants rather than the clerk and
the board can dictate the time such not~s should be tran~cribed, ~co1upleted or entered in the journal would neces~arily involve the result that tentative men1oranda representing mere ·steps in n1ental or administrative processes
\vould be subject at a.ny time to de1nands for copying, e:: rtifica.tion, publication and introduction as proof of final action, to the impairment or detriment ,of public agencies, including courts; the deceiving and confusing of the public
and t() the injury of the general welfare.
Section 78-26-2, UCA, 1953, dealing with the right to
inspect and copy public writings has been quoted. Section
78-26-3, UCA, 1953, provides that every public official having the custody of a public writing which a citizen has the
right to inspect is bound to give him, on demand, a certified
copy of it on payment of the legal fee therefor. Rule 44(e)
URCP, defines an official record consistent with the statute,
and Rule 44(a) governs the admissibility in evidence of an
authenticated copy, and Rule 44(d) provides that a copy
a.f any official record or entry thereof in the custody of a
public officer of this state or the United States, certified by
the officer having custody thereof, to be a full, true and
correct copy of the original in his custody, may be read in
evidence in an action or proceeding in the courts of this
state in like manner and with like effect as the original could
be if produced.
If it were to be held that the tentative notes of the clerk
in question were public writings or official records within
the purview of Sec. 78-26-2, giving the right to inspect and
copy, they would, of course, be public writings for the purposes of Sec. 78-26-3, concerning the furnishing of certified
::opies, and they \Vould be an official record for the purpose
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of admissibility as evidence upon the certification of the custodian.
The court found, based upon the stipulation of fact,
that in the past the ·clerk had released tentative notes prior
to their checking, which involved inaccuracies. It was a
fair, usual and wise precaution to avoid this that the means
were adopted which appellants now question. If appellants
are correct, they would have the right not only with respect
to the tentative notes in question, but with respect to the
tentative or rough notes or memoranda of any clerk of court
or clerk of any other public body to demand inspection and
certified copies, and their introduction in evidence in any
court. Mere steps in the mental or ministerial processes
of a clerk in the making up of an accurate record would
thus be published or otherwise established as the final record
at any stage. If this were so, a newspaperman, or any other
citizen, could demand the tentative memorandum of the
clerk of this honorable Court or of a trial court before any
final entries are made, and indeed, while an argument is
progressing, no matter how rough, misleading, or incomplete
their form; could publish them in their unfinished, rough
and perhaps misleading form, to the disaster of public service.
The appellants and amici curiae have no vested rights
in the mental or ministerial processes of clerks, whether
they be school board clerks or clerks of this honorable Court,
so long as public writings in the statutory sense are not involved. The appellants and amici curiae take the position
that the notes of the clerk are necessarily public writings,
no matter how tentative, incomplete or inaccurate.
There is nothing in the record to show that the particular notes in question were complete or acclirate, and the
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~ourt

found upon the stipulated record that they vvere merely tentative. So contending, undoubtedly appellants would
treat or publish as official and final any notes released. Unless public bodies, in cooperation with their clerks, can adopt
reasonable measures to insure the verity of minutes before
their release as public writings, the pubHc interest would
irreparably suffer \vithout any b-enefit whatsoever to 'the
cause of a free press or the people's right to know the truth,
but with aid and comfort to the cause of misinformation and
distortion. The same thing applies to every governmental
activity. If appellants and amici curiae can dictate how and
\vhen records are to be transcribed and that they must be
released as official without checking or approval of any
kind, they can carry such demands into every office in the
state, to the utter disaster of public administration.
Suppose all clerks, including the clerk of this honorable
Court, is bound to release as an official writing anything
put down in tentative or memorandum form without checking or revision at the time anyone may demand inspection.
If an entirely erroneous record, unverified or in rough form,
be made with the idea of revision, under this theory it still
would have to be released and ,certified to as an official writing at any stage in the process of formulating it, so long as
it was in writing. If this were so, some weird "public writings" would result, including possibly a notation on the pad
of the clerk of this Court, if perchance he should check over
this brief, that "The attorney for respondent fs guilty of the
constant repetition of an obvious point." This may be true,
but it may have no place in the clerk's official record. Be·fore any such record is required to be released as a public
\vriting, the clerk in connection with the Court, should at
l.east be permitted to check it over; before the repetition in
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the Court's mind becomes inescapable, the writer will pass
to other phases of the case. In all earnestness, we do contend, however, that the position of appellants and amici
curiae on general principles and upon examination from
practical, as well as legal, standpoints is untenable.
We do not believe that the authorities cited by appellants, the reasoning of those authorities, sustain appellants'
position; indeed, the cases cited indicating that memoranda
n1ay be looked to as a foundation of nunc pro tunc entries
or orders., in the absence of official writings, only emphasize
the position of the respondents. So, also in many states can
other forms of testimony be utilized to show what the action actually was in the absence of official writings, but this
does no ·mean that such oral testimony or such other secondary evidence can be looked to as a substitute for official
writings rather than as an aid to their formulation.
The case of State v. Hunter, 127 W.Va. 38, 34 S. E. 2d
468, while containing a general definition of a public record,
which appellants seem to prefer to our statutory definition,
involves a holding directly opposed to appellants' contention. Morrison v. White, 10 c·al. Appl. 61, 252 P.2d 261,
shows that the time the entry is actually made in the journal is a mere detail under the control of the responsible officer, but it likewise fails to support appellants' position.
Other authorities cited by appellants also seem not to support their position, but to sustain in principle the reasoning
involved in respondents' position. There seems to be no
point of further analyzing these decisions as even appellants
do not seem to contend that any of them are directly in
point.
To adopt the contention of appellants, we submit, would
bring into our law and practice several disastrous doctrines~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
~ncluding

the doctrine that the individual citizen, or the
court at his request, should determine in detail in point of
time and specific manner the means to be used by clerical
or administrative officers in discharging the duties entrusted
peculiarly to them; the doctrine that in any stage in an administrative, clerical or mental process carried on by a public officer the particular status of his record in its incomplete and unfinished form can be demanded, and thus frozen,
and its certification required as a public writing; the doctrine that the requirement that the clerk keep an accurate
journal should be interpreted as meaning that any memoranda written out by the clerk as a preliminary to keeping
that accurate journal must, itself, be considered as the accurate journal, notwithstanding its incompleteness or inaccuriacies; and the doctrine that clerks may not lawfully act
in cooperation with their supervisory boards in discharging the duties entrusted to them.
We submit that both from the standpoint of law and
of practice, the contentions of the appelants are not well
taken, and that measured from either standpoint the determination of the trial court was correct.
IV. No constitutional or other rights of freedo1n of
the press are involved in a refusal to treat as a !lJublic writing that which is not a public writing; the complaint of the
appellants and amici curiae, !and the facts, being not that
any infonnation was actually denied or withheld or that
the tentative notes of the clerk were accurate or complete
when deman~d, but that the )respondents failed to recognize and release as official and public writings the tentative
notes on which an accurate journal record would be based
after correction and lupon the completion of the mental and
administrative processes reasonably necessary to insure
their accuracy.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
The impressive array of amici curiae has no controlling
point in this case. In almost every proceeding before this
Court, the rule to be announced will affect more or less large
numbers of persons throughout the state in similar situa~
tions; yet the weighing of the issues by the number is not
a procedure whi~ch has any place or hope here, and is nbt
a procedure necessarily conducive to correct results. We
may, therefore, be pardoned for our failure to enlist as participants the numerous clerks, offices and agencies--indeed, the great body of our citizenry--to be adversely af..
fected by a reversal of the decision of the trial court herein.
We believe that it goes without saying that if newspapers
or any other elements in our society can demand and pub~
lish, or establish, as final offi~cial writings, the rough notes
or memoranda of the record keepers before they purport to
be accurate public records of any proceeding, the proper
administration of the very Government, including courts,
whose protection the newspapers require, would be rendered
impossible.
There is no showing whatsoever in this case that anyone was deprived of the right to ascertain the true facts concerning the meeting of the school board. It is admitted that
the meeting was public and that anyone had the right to attend or to secure information from any source. There is
no showing that the defendants did not have full information of what happened at the meeting, or that the clerk
himself would not give them all information in his possession. The only showing is that he declined to release his
tehtative notes as official writings at that ti·me. It is established that within a reasonable time and in the discharge
of his statutory duties, the clerk did in fact enter an accurate record of the proceedings in the journal required by
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la\v to be kept by him, and that such record, or any other
official record, has never been denied appellants or anyone
else by the clerk or by the board. This is not a case involving freedom of the press, as amici curiae seeks to show; no
one has sought to prevent publication of any proceedings
or to suppress any official records; no one seeks to. This
is a case where the appellants demanded the release, not of
an official writing, but unreasonably demanded that tentative notes not comprising an official record be released as
an official \Yriting for use as such. If freedom of the press is
to be destroyed in this country, it may well be by recognition of similar ill-advised contentions as here made, leading
to such abuse and injury to the public welfare and the processes of government as to create a reaction incompatible
with full support for this great doctrine.
We refer again to the recent book, "The People's Right
to Know" (Harold L. Cross, Columbia University, 1953), in
which we believe one would expect to find the most favorable
presentation of the claim of newspapers to freedom of access to information, since the book was commissioned by the
:National Newspaper Alliance. The brief of amici curiae
on the general subject of freedom of the press sets out some
of the cases contained in the publication mentioned, but a
vast array of others, or on other phases of the problem, but
with particular reference to rights of newspapers, is set out
by Mr. Cross, including a large number of cases concerning,
and references to, "Records Not Subject to Public Inspection." Mr. Cross, in stating the general rules as to records,
lays down the following principles, supporting his statement
\vith numerous authorities:
"1. The record must be 'public' in the legal sense.
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ces in the business of the public is not necessarily c.
'public record' in the sense of being subject to inspection.
"It is clear that the mere fact that a document or
paper is deposited or on file in public offi,ce or is with
or in the custody of a public officers does not make it
a public record. The term 'record' is ordinarily applied
to public records only. Generally there is no single test
which may be applied to determine what are and what
are not public records. ~he primary test is definition~
which is dealt with in Chapter IV.
"2. The term 'public' should be read with the word
'record' in the state statutes. Re·cords which are subject to inspection, except as otherwise provided by statutes, are those only which are public. That is the case
whether or not the particular statute uses the word
'public.' Thus, the Florida statute in terms grants any
citizen a right of inspection of 'All state, county and
' (Appendix 3). Neverthemunicipal records .
less, the only records subject to the right of inspection
are those that are public, and that means only those
held 'public' by the courts or in opinions of the A ttorney General.

"The effect of this is that there must be read into
the state statutes regarding inspection, whether contained there or not, the word 'public'. This applies, as
stated, to Florida and other states. Most state statutes,
however, use the term 'public' to modify 'records'. (Ap~
pendix 3)
"
(P. 33).
Mr. Cross also concedes at various points in his fine
book that i:f the ordinary citizen does not have the right to
inspect a writing as a public writing, a newspaper or a newspaperman does not.
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If amici curiae herein question these basic propositions,
\ve can best refer the Court to the exhaustive study mentioned, \Vhich certainly is from the viewpoint most favorable to their contentions. If they do not question these propositions, most of the arguments and authorities cited in
their brief lose their point. To say that the general citizen
is not entitled to the right to inspect unless there is Involved
a public writing in connection with which subject the right
is created by the statute, vvhile a newspaperman has an unlimited right of inspection by virtue of the statute is not arguing for freedom of the press, but for special privilege inconsistent with our theory of Government.
An analysis of the cases cited has not proved productive of facts and situations in point. We have no quarrel
\vith the rules of statutory construction that all pertinent
·::>r related statutes must be construed together, in support
of which it was considered necessary by amici curiae to cite
numerous cases; but it is not shown by the cases or by any
reasoning of theirs that in construing the pertinent statutes,
together or singly, the writing in question was a "public writing" \vithin the contemplation of the Utah statute or that
the failure of the clerk to release it as such public writing
impaired in any way the freedom of the press.
We do not question that a newspaper has the right to
immediate access to public writings so as to acquaint the
public with the action of the board, but we do deny that a
newspaper can, or that a court should, dictate unreasonable
and impracticable standards as to the making of the public
record, such as is attempted by the appellants here.
Several of the cases relied most strongly upon by amici
curiae turn on specific statutes not ·having any cormterpart
in our law. For instance, in re: Becker, 192 N. Y. Supp.
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754, Sec. 54 of the general municipal law was involved, providing that all "'Books, minute, entries or accounts and the
books, bills, vouchers, checks, contracts or other papers con~
nected with or used or filed in the office of or with any officer, board or commission
. are hereby declared'
" Records, receipts and
to be public records
disbursements in the mayor's office were deemed to come
within this statutory definition. Also, Sears Roebuck Co.
v. Hoyt, 107 N. Y. Suppl. 2nd 756, turned on a special stat~
ute, as did a number of the other cases cited. In re: Hays
73 So. 362, cited by amici curiae on p. 22 of their brief, arose
on motion to quash a rule upon the defendant newspaper~
man to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt, and involved a law allowing inspection of the records of the city, except those of the law and police departments. It is therein indicated that the publishers of newspapers have no higher rights than others to publish the
conduct of the courts and that such rights are limited by
the obligation to observe respect for truth and fairness.
Except for the general principles of freedom of the
press with which we heartily concur, we believe that what
has been argued concerning public writings and the facts
in this case in relation thereto, answer the contentions of
amici curiae as fully as the limitations of this brief will permit. We submit that amici curiae have added no good reason why the judgment of the trial court should not be sustained.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court was correct and sound,
that under the admitted circumstances set out in the answer
the tentative notes made by the clerk which were demanded
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by the appellants before their approval by the board and
prior to their entry in the journal were not public writings
\Vithin the purview of Sec. 78-26-1, UCA, 1953; that the
notes or memoranda taken by the clerk for his own convenience in the process of entering an accurate record in
the journal are not public records; that a clerk has a right
to take reasonable steps in assuring the accuracy of the
journal entries contemplated by the statute; that the steps
taken by the respondents for this purpose were not unreasonable, and that the Court may not require the immediate release of such tentative notes as public writing with the
incidents of certification, publication as official action, and
admissibility in evidence, as sought by the appellants in this
case.
The findings of the trial court are adequately supported by the record. The conclusions of the trial court are in
accordance with the law, every fair concept of freedom of
the press, and are practicable from the standpoint of reason
and administration. The contentions of the appellants and
amici curiae, if adopted, would lead to confusion and public
injury. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed,
\vith costs to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON
Attorneys for Respondents
First Security Bank Bldg.
Provo, Utah
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